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Socially Rational Models for Autonomous Agents
James K. Archibald∗, Wynn C. Stirling, and Matthew S. Nokleby
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 84602, USA
Abstract: Autonomous multi-agent systems that are to coordinate must be designed according to models that accommodate such complex social behavior as compromise, negotiation, and altruism. In contrast to individually rational
models, where each agent seeks to maximize its own welfare without regard for others, socially rational agents have
interests beyond themselves. Such models require a new type of utility function—a social utility—to ensure three desirable properties: (a) conditional preferences—agents may adjust their preferences to account for the preferences of
others; (b) endogeny—group preferences are determined internally by interactions between individual agents; (c) framing invariance—reformulations of the social model using exactly the same information should not alter the conclusions;
and (d) social coherence—no individual’s welfare is categorically subjugated to the welfare of the group. Social utilities
in turn require a compatible solution concept—optimal failure-avoidance. Satisficing game theory embodies both social
rationality and optimal failure-avoidance and provides a formal mathematical framework in which to balance group and
individual interests in mixed-motive societies. The satisficing approach is applied to two scenarios: the Ultimatum game
and a random graph search problem. The Ultimatum game is one for which game-theoretic analysis does not correspond
well to empirical data regarding human behavior; it is thus an important test case for a new theory. The graph search
scenario is an idealization of an important resource allocation problem in which the ability to compromise and negotiate
can greatly facilitate the search for a solution.
Keywords: Decision theory, rationality, multi-agent coordination, satisficing game theory.

INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent system design is essentially a problem in social
design. That is, successful systems must coordinate the behavior of individual members so as to accomplish tasks that
are beyond the reach of any individual. In the most interesting
systems, individual agents are assumed to be autonomous and
to have private as well as public concerns. For such systems
a successful design methodology must permit agents to make
decisions that balance individual and group welfare.
To make rational decisions agents must have (a) a set of criteria to evaluate the effects that a choice has on its welfare and,
(b) a solution concept that selects the most suitable choices.
Agents are said to be individually rational when the criteria
are defined by utility functions and the solution concept is
to maximize expected utility. This is the perspective of von
Neumann-Morgenstern game theory [1], in which agents form
their preferences prior to any social interaction and then seek
to maximize their individual welfare, subject to the constraint
that other agents are doing the same. The resulting solution is
a Nash equilibrium [2].
The assumption of individual rationality is well-suited to
competitive societies, but in mixed-motive and potentially cooperative situations the choices it prescribes can be both individually and socially dysfunctional [3–5]. Arrow has observed
that “rationality in application is not merely a property of the
individual. Its useful and powerful implications derive from
the conjunction of individual rationality and other basic concepts of neoclassical theory—equilibrium, competition, and
completeness of markets . . . When these assumptions fail, the
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very concept of rationality becomes threatened, because perceptions of others and, in particular, their rationality become
part of one’s own rationality” [6, p. 203]. Thus it is not at all
clear that individual rationality is an appropriate model for the
synthesis of artificial multi-agent systems.
Luce and Raiffa observed a half-century ago that “general
game theory seems to be in part a sociological theory which
does not include any sociological assumptions . . . it may be
too much to ask that any sociology be derived from the single
assumption of individual rationality” [7, p. 196]. Since then,
numerous studies in experimental psychology and behavioral
economics have cast doubt on the adequacy of the individual
rationality hypothesis as a general model for social behavior
[3–5, 8–11].
Schelling has observed [12] that societies take many forms,
ranging from purely competitive societies, in which it is difficult to define a coherent notion of group preference and for
which individual rationality is very appropriate, to purely coordinative societies, where all participants are in complete agreement regarding their preferences and actions. For these societies a group preference is easily defined by the Pareto principle: if an action is simultaneously preferred by all players,
then it is preferred by the group.
Between these two extremes lies the vast and important family of mixed-motive societies, where opportunities for both
competition and coordination are present. In such societies the
assumption that individual preferences are completely determined without social interaction is not self-evident. Certainly,
competition implies no concern for the welfare of others, but
the very term coordination implies “the harmonious functioning together of different interrelated parts” [13]. If an agent
truly has no interest in others, it seems that any coordination
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it might achieve would be accidental. On the other hand, we
would expect a society either disposed (human systems) or intended (artificial systems) to coordinate to benefit from such
social behaviors such cooperation, compromise, negotiation,
and even altruism.
Consider an alternate point of view, one admittedly not as
neat as individual rationality but far more amenable to modeling social behavior. Let the proximate aim of the agents be
to avoid failure, both for themselves individually and for the
group as a whole. Failure-avoidance, while seemingly a more
modest goal than utility maximization, has important advantages:
• Optimal behavior in multi-agent systems, either for individuals or the group, may be difficult or impossible to define. However, failure-avoidance concepts such as functionality, reliability, robustness, flexibility, and survivability can always be formed.
• Even when well defined, the optimization of utility is
intrinsically an individual enterprise. If each individual were to optimize, the resulting behaviors would not
necessarily be optimal, or even acceptable, to the group.
The opposite is also true. In contrast, as will be established, failure-avoidance can apply simultaneously to
both groups and individuals.
• Optimization produces a single solution, but failureavoidance can often be achieved in more than one way.
This provides alternatives for negotiation and compromise which can often reconcile group and individual interests to the satisfaction of both.
In the following we propose a model of social rationality
for agents in mixed-motive societies. It differs from the individual rationality model in both (a) the criteria used to evaluate choices, and (b) the solution concept used to identify acceptable decisions. Social rationality requires a social utility
function that permits agents to define their preference orderings in a way that accounts for the preferences, as well as the
possible actions, of others. We further present a formalization of the intuitive notion of failure-avoidance. This new solution concept—satisficing game theory—accommodates sophisticated social relationships such as coordination, compromise, negotiation, and altruism. A remarkable feature of
this theory is that coherent group and individual preferences
emerge as a result of agent interactions.
We illustrate satisficing game theory with two applications.
The first, the Ultimatum game, gives results consistent with
experimental data that departs from the game-theoretic analysis. The second is a simulated graph search by a multi-agent
team; n autonomous agents must coordinate to visit all nodes
in a random graph with the constraint that they maintain communication with each other. We show that satisficing game
theory is ideally suited to this problem since it accommodates
multiple solutions for each player, providing opportunities for
negotiation and compromise. We present simulation results
that quantify performance and demonstrate the emergence of
important coordinated behaviors.
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SOCIAL RATIONALITY
A society is any collection of agents such that its members
have the ability to influence each other’s behavior or welfare.
A sub-society is any subset of a society. In particular, an individual is a singleton sub-society. Let G = {X1 , . . . , Xn } be
a society with joint action space U = U1 × · · · × Un , and let
Gi = {Xi1 , . . . , Xik } be any sub-society, with corresponding
action space Ui = Ui1 × · · · × Uik . We assume four axioms
for autonomous, socially rational, mixed-motive societies.
Axiom 1 (Conditional Preferences) Sub-societies may condition their preferences on the preferences of other sub-societies.
Conditional preferences are hypothetical statements that enable a sub-society to define its preferences as a function of the
possible preferences of another sub-society without actually
knowing the preferences of the other, and without making a
categorical commitment to the other.
To develop the concept of conditioning, we must first define
a preference order. A sub-society Gi possesses a total preference ordering if there exists a reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive, and complete preference relation pair (≻Gi , ∼Gi ) over
ui ∈ Ui , where ui ≻Gi u′i means that Gi strictly prefers ui
to u′i , and u ∼Gi u′i means preferences for the two actions
are equivalent. The expression ui Gi u′i means that either
ui ≻Gi u′i or ui ∼Gi u′i , in which case ui is preferred to u′i
(but not strictly).
Let Gi and Gj be disjoint sub-societies of G with corresponding action subspaces Ui and Uj , respectively. A conditional preference ordering for Gi given Gj corresponds to
a hypothetical proposition involving an antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent corresponds to a hypothesized preference ordering for Gj ; namely, that uj Gj u′j for all u′j ∈ Uj .
Such a hypothesized preference ordering is denoted a commitment to uj by Gj . Given this antecedent, the consequent corresponds to the resulting preferences of Gi , expressed as a conditional preference ordering (≻Gi |Gj , ∼Gi |Gj ). The expression
ui |uj ≻Gi |Gj u′i |u′j means that Gi strictly prefers ui given
that Gj is committed to uj , to u′i given that Gj is committed
to u′j , and ui |uj ∼Gi |Gj u′i |u′j means that Gi is conditionally indifferent. The expression ui |uj Gi |Gj u′i |u′j signifies
either strict conditional preference or conditional indifference.
A conditional preference forms a total ordering when uj = u′j .
To illustrate the notion of conditional preference, suppose Gi ’s action space is to choose the model of a car
(i.e., Uj = convertible, sedan), and Gj ’s action space is
to choose the color (i.e., Uj = red, green). The expression convertible|red ≻Gi |Gj sedan|green means that Gi
prefers convertibles, given that Gj prefers red to green, over
sedans, given that Gj prefers green to red. The expression
convertible|red ≻Gi |Gj sedan|red is somewhat simpler to interpret; it means that Gi prefers convertibles to sedans if Gj
prefers red to green.
Conditional preferences permit the specification of wellformed group goals, as well as operationally meaningful group
preferences.
Axiom 2 (Endogeny) If preference orderings exist for a so-
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ciety, they must be determined by interactions between subsocieties.
Axiom 2 prohibits the exogenous or external imposition of
a social preference. In particular, it prohibits the use of a classical social welfare function. If some notion of collective preference exists for a society, it must emerge internally. This is a
rather broad interpretation of autonomy, broader perhaps than
many applications currently require, but one that we believe
will become increasingly important as multi-agent systems are
deployed for long periods of time in dynamic environments
without human supervision.
Axiom 3 (Framing Invariance) If a social model can be
framed in more than one way using exactly the same information, all framings should yield the same decisions.
A consequence of framing invariance is that there must be
some concept of reciprocity; that is, if the preference ordering
over one sub-society is conditioned on the preferences of another sub-society, then it is theoretically possible to re-frame
the problem such that the preference ordering of the second
sub-society can be expressed in terms of conditional preference orderings given the preferences of the first sub-society. If
this assumption is violated, then either (a) some information
has been lost or ignored in the re-framing, (b) the information has not been applied consistently, or (c) one of the subsocieties is intransigent and unwilling to take into consideration a different context when defining its preferences. This last
concern can be problematic if multiple decision makers are involved. However, if a society is to be robust and enduring, it
is reasonable to assume that the individuals do not form their
preferences in a social vacuum, but rather in a social context
that takes into account the fact that they must interact with
others. This is particularly true for an artificial society that is
designed to be cooperative.
Axiom 4 (Social Coherence) No sub-society must be categorically required to subjugate its own welfare to the society in all
situations in order to benefit the society.
Axiom 4 is a weak notion of social equity which requires
only that a society must allow for the possibility (but not the
guarantee) that each sub-society can get its way, at least some
of the time. It is tantamount to avoiding sure subjugation,
whereby an individual or sub-society is required to sacrifice
its welfare in all circumstances in order to benefit the larger
group.
None of these axioms is compatible with the classical formulation. To accommodate these four axioms we require a
new utility function, called a social utility.
Social Utilities
The function pGi is a social utility if pGi (ui ) ≥
pGi (u′i ) ⇐⇒ ui Gi u′i [14, 15]. If Gi = G, pG is a joint
social utility, and if Gi = {Xi }, a singleton sub-society, then
pGi = pXi is the marginal social utility for Xi . The function pGi |Gj is a conditional social utility if pGi |Gj (ui |uj ) ≥
pGi |Gj (u′i |u′j ) ⇐⇒ ui |uj Gi |Gj u′i |u′j . This structure allows Gi to define its preferences as functions of each of Gj ’s
possible most-preferred choices, and it is the mechanism by
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which Gi can extend its sphere of interest beyond itself.
Consider the problem where we are given arbitrary disjoint
sub-societies Gi and Gj of society G, utility pGj (for Gj ) and
conditional utility pGi |Gj , and we wish to aggregate the given
utilities to determine the social utility of sub-society Gi ∪ Gj .
With respect to Axiom 2, we say that G possesses endogenously aggregated utilities if, for any two disjoint sub-societies
Gi and Gj , pGi ∪Gj , the social utility of sub-society Gi ∪ Gj ,
is a function of the given utility pGj and the given conditional utility pGi |Gj . That is, there exists a function F , nondecreasing in both arguments, such that
pGi ∪Gj (ui , uj ) = F [pGj (uj ), pGi |Gj (ui |uj )].

(1)

(Note that, according to Axiom 3, reversing the roles of i
and j would yield an identical aggregated utility for the new
sub-society.) For this form of aggregation to correspond to a
group preference it must be a total ordering of Ui × Uj . Fortunately this property is immediate, since the binary relation
(ui , uj ) Gi ∪Gj (u′i , u′j ) for the sub-society Gi ∪ Gj is induced by the function F , and hence is reflexive, antisymmetric,
transitive, and complete. A reasonable and intuitively important property of a group ordering is that if ui |uj Gi |Gj u′i |u′j
and uj ∼Gj u′j , or if ui |uj ∼Gi |Gj u′i |u′j and uj Gj u′j ,
then (ui , uj ) Gi ∪Gj (u′i , u′j ). This condition obtains if and
only if F is non-decreasing in both arguments.
Framing invariance requires that pGi ∪Gj (ui , uj ) =
pGj ∪Gi (uj , ui ) or, in other words,
F [pGj (uj ), pGi |Gj (ui |uj )] = F [pGi (ui ), pGj |Gi (uj |ui )].
(2)
It is important to appreciate that endogenous aggregation is
strictly a mathematical operation, and may or may not correspond to harmonious, or even purposeful, group behavior.
Such a preference ordering is emergent, in that it may not be
anticipated or explicitly modeled, and it can take many forms.
If the members of a society are in total opposition, such as
in a zero-sum game, then the group “preference” should be
to compete. At the other extreme, a society in which coordinated behavior yields high rewards for participating agents, the
group preference should be consistent with that behavior. The
absence of any meaningful concept of group preference would
be an indication that the group is dysfunctional.
Compliance with Axiom 4 requires that social utilities possess the additional property of social coherence. A society
G has socially coherent utilities if, for any two disjoint subsocieties Gi and Gj , pGi (ui ) ≥ pGi (u′i ) implies that there
exists u∗j ∈ Uj such that pGi ∪Gj (ui , u∗j ) ≥ pGi ∪Gj (u′i , u∗j )
(where u∗j may depend on ui ). Social coherence means that
if one sub-society prefers one action over another, then, for
any other sub-society, there exists some action such that the
resulting joint action is preferred by the combined sub-society.
The violation of social coherence would result in a condition
of sure subjugation, in the sense that under no condition would
such a sub-society be able simultaneously to benefit itself and
the society.
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Axioms 2 and 4 guarantee an important common-sense result. Suppose that pGi |Gj (ui |uj ) ≥ pGi |Gj (u′i |uj ) for all uj ∈
Uj . Endogenous aggregation ensures that pGi ∪Gj (ui , uj ) ≥
pGi ∪Gj (u′i , uj ) for all uj ∈ Uj . If this condition holds then,
by social coherence, pGi (ui ) ≥ pGi (u′i ). Thus, these axioms
ensure that, if Gi prefers ui to u′i no matter what action Gj
prefers, it is better for both the larger society Gi ∪ Gj and Gi
that Gi implement ui rather than u′j .
The Sociality Theorem
There is in probability theory an important analogue to
avoiding sure subjugation, namely, the wagering concept of
avoiding sure loss—a betting situation such that, no matter
what the outcome, the gambler loses. The Dutch Book theorem [16, 17] and its converse [18] state that it is not possible to
construct a bet such that the individual will lose money no matter what happens if and only if the gambler acts in accordance
with a probability measure that describes the individual’s degrees of belief in the propositions under consideration. Such a
belief system is said to be coherent.
Probability theory is chiefly concerned with the epistemological domain (i.e., the classification of propositions on the
basis of knowledge and belief), and it is used to express the
degrees of belief regarding the truth of propositions. However,
the mathematical structure of probability can also be applied
to the praxeological domain (i.e., the classification of actions
on the basis of effectiveness and efficiency) to express the degrees of suitability of a set of actions. To this end, we define a praxeological mass function as a non-negative function
that is normalized to sum to unity over its domain space; that
is, pP
Gi is a praxeological mass function if pGi (ui ) ≥ 0 ∀ui
and ui ∈Ui pGi (ui ) = 1, and pGi |Gj is a conditional praxeological mass function if pGi |Gj (ui |uj ) ≥ 0 ∀ui , ∀uj and
P
ui ∈Ui pGi |Gj (ui |uj ) = 1 ∀uj .

Theorem 1 (The sociality theorem) Let {pGi } be a family
of social utilities for all sub-societies of G and let {pGi |Gj }
be a family of conditional social utilities associated with all
pairs of disjoint sub-societies of G. These social utilities are
endogenously aggregated if and only if they are praxeological
mass functions, in which case
F [p (uj ), p
Gj

Gi |Gj

(ui |uj )] = p

Gi |Gj

(ui |uj )p (uj ).
Gj

(3)

A proof of this theorem for F differentiable in both arguments is provided in the Appendix. Social utilities thus possess
all of the syntactical properties of probability mass functions,
albeit with praxeological, rather than epistemological, semantics.
• Marginalization: let Gi be an arbitrary sub-society of
G and let G¬i denote the complementary sub-society of
Gi . Then the social utility of Gi is obtained by summing pG (u) over all actions in G¬i . It isPconvenient to
express this sum via “not-sum” notation ¬{ui } , which
sums over all elements not equal to ui , yielding
X
pG (u).
(4)
pGi (ui ) =
¬{ui }
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To illustrate this notation, if G = {X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 }, the
marginal social utility of {X2 , X4 } is
X
pG (u)
pX2 X4 (u2 , u4 ) =
¬{u2 ,u4 }

=

XX

pG (u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 ). (5)

{u1 } {u3 }

• Independence: if Gj ’s preferences have no influence on
the preferences of Gi , then
pGi |Gj (ui |uj ) = pGi (ui ),

(6)

and Gi and Gj are praxeologically independent subsocieties.
The concept of conditioning, as defined earlier, is the property that underlies the probabilistic syntax (albeit with praxeological rather than epistemological semantics) of the utilities.
Thus, there is a distinct analogy between the use of this syntax
as an epistemological model of belief regarding the truth of
propositions and a praxeological model of efficiency and effectiveness of taking action. It should be noted that it is also
possible to define conditional probability (in the conventional
epistemological sense) axiomatically, rather than as a derivative of the traditional Kolmogorov axioms [19, Chapter 2].
Social utilities differ from classical utilities in several ways.
First, classical utilities are assumed to be invariant to scale and
zero-level, but social utilities are not. Second, interpersonal
comparisons of utility are not permitted with classical utilities,
but such comparisons are both natural and desirable with social
utilities. Third, classical utilities are functions of the actions of
all agents, whereas social utilities are functions of preferences
for action, and only within the sub-society over which they
are defined. However, because sub-society utilities are derived
from joint social utilities by marginalization, they encode all
relationships from the global context that are important to the
sub-society.
OPTIMALITY
For social utilities to be of practical value, two fundamental
issues must be addressed: (a) how they can be used for modeling mixed-motive societies, and (b) how the performance
of agents who use social utilities can be evaluated. In other
words, some notion of optimization must be defined.
A classical way to achieve an optimal group decision requires the maximization of a social welfare function, typically
defined as an aggregation of individual welfare functions [20].
However, this violates the autonomy of participating agents.
If attempted, there would likely be a lack of consensus regarding what is best. Indeed, one may view a social welfare
function as a mathematical “dictator” which imposes a single
value system on potentially independent and possibly uncoordinated decision makers, and so creates a group, in the sense
of a super-individual, by fiat.
An alternative approach is to broaden the applicability of the
classical approach by including social considerations into the
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utility functions, such as inequity aversion, fairness, and reciprocal kindness. Researchers report more accurate modeling
of human behavior in certain realistic settings [21–24]. However, as discussed earlier, accounting for social considerations
via classical utility functions is tantamount to simulating social behavior with a mechanism designed for asocial behavior.
Simply put, it is the wrong tool. The challenge is to develop a
methodology that (a) possesses some form of logical and internal consistency between individual and group-level interests,
and (b) admits a well-defined concept of optimality. This goal
requires a new approach to the formulation of decision problems.

Archibald et al.

proach to the error-avoidance formulation of the decision problem. As discussed above, the proximate aim of the agent is to
avoid error, but this aim is tempered by a demand for information. Information, in this context, is obtained by eliminating propositions from serious consideration. Levi constructs
two utilities to account for these competing criteria: an erroravoidance utility and an informational value utility.
Let U = {u1 , u2 , . . . , uN } be a finite set of propositions,
one of which is true, and let B denote a Boolean algebra of
subsets of U . Then for any set A ∈ B, A is true if and only
if A contains the true element. The error-avoidance utility is
then defined as

Decision Formulation
To motivate a re-formulation of the multi-agent decision
problem, it will be helpful to change the context and consider
first an epistemological decision problem. Suppose an agent
is confronted with a number of propositions, all of which are
possibly true, but only one of which is in fact true. The agent
could insist on a single answer—”the truth and nothing but the
truth”—but if the evidence is not sufficient to identify a single
proposition as true, such behavior would be temerarious. A
more circumspect investigator would, in the interest of avoiding error, eliminate from consideration only those possibilities
that are unlikely to be true or that, even if true, are of little consequence (as Popper noted, “Yet we must also stress that truth
is not the only aim of science. We want more than truth: what
we look for is interesting truth” [25, p. 229, emphasis in original]), and continue to investigate until sufficient evidence is
obtained to identify the true proposition.
The pragmatic philosopher William James referred to this
formulation of a decision problem as error-avoiding: “There
are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion,—
ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference
the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very
little concern. We must know the truth, and we must avoid
error,—these are our first and great commandments as wouldbe knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical
commandment, they are two separable laws . . . Believe truth!
Shun error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws;
and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for
truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or
we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more
imperative, and let truth take its chance” [26, pp. 17,18, emphasis in original].
Simply put, an error-avoider is a cautious truth-seeker; one
who does not insist on identifying a unique solution in all circumstances. There are various degrees of error-avoidance, depending on the amount and quality of information available.
Ideally, one is able to eliminate all but one proposition, thereby
exposing the true one. But in general, there may be several
non-eliminated propositions, each with a claim to being true.
An error-avoider refines its choices to the extent warranted by
the information, but is not obligated to settle on a unique solution.
The philosopher Isaac Levi [27] has defined a rigorous ap-

T (A) =

(

1
0

if A is true
,
otherwise

(7)

where A is the set of propositions that will not be eliminated.
Note that a conventional utility would have the same structure,
but requires A to be a singleton set. It is straightforward to see
that T (U ) = 1 and that T is additive over disjoint sets (i.e.,
T (A1 ∪ A2 ) = T (A1 ) + T (A2 ) if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅). Thus, T is
a normalized measure over B.
An agent can guarantee that T (A) = 1 only by setting
A = U , but this results in no information gain. To temper
the desire to avoid error with the demand for information, the
agent must compute the informational value of each set A. For
reasons that will become clear, this value will be determined
by considering the informational value of rejecting A.
Whether or not it is true, A is assumed to have some intrinsic informational value. Such abductive inferences are hypothetical statements of informational importance while temporarily ignoring considerations of veracity. They may take
many forms, including economic, political, moral, cognitive,
aesthetic, or personal. The following assumptions constitute
a reasonable model for informational value: (a) informational
value is non-negative; (b) the informational value of rejecting
the union of two disjoint sets of propositions is equal to the
sum of the informational values of rejecting the individual sets;
and (c) the informational value of rejecting U is unity. This
structure implies that informational valuations comply with the
rules of classical measure theory. Let PR denote a measure that
maps elements of B to the unit interval. PR (A) is a utility that
represents the informational value that accrues to the agent if
A is rejected. Defining informational value in this way corresponds to the error-avoiding view of rejecting propositions,
rather than the conventional view of accepting one and only
one proposition.
The utility PR is not a classical utility because it is a mapping of sets of propositions—elements of the Boolean algebra B over the proposition space U —rather than a mapping
of individual propositions in U . However, if the Boolean algebra contains all singleton sets, the resulting classical utility function pR (u) = PR ({u}). pR (u) P
is a mass function,
that is, pR (u)P≥ 0 for all u ∈ U and u∈U pR (u) = 1,
so PR (A) = u∈A pR (u). The informational value of non-
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rejection of A is then defined as
I(A) = 1 − PR (A).

(8)

The utility of both avoiding error and acquiring information
is given by a convex combination of T (A) and I(A), yielding
Levi’s epistemic utility function
φ(A) = αT (A) + (1 − α)I(A),

(9)

where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The parameter α represents the relative
importance that is attached to avoiding error versus acquiring
information. Setting α = 0 puts a premium on avoiding error,
and setting α = 1 places a premium on the desire for information regardless of its veracity. As a practical issue, α should
be restricted to the interval [1/2, 1] to ensure that no erroneous
answer is preferred to any correct answer.
By construction, φ is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility,
even though it is a function of sets of propositions, rather than
of single propositions. Consequently, it is invariant to scale
and zero level, and an equivalent utility is
φα (A)

1−α
1
φ(A) −
α
α
= T (A) − qPR (A)
(
1 − qPR (A) if A is true
=
−qPR (A)
if A is false
=

(10)

where q = (1 − α)/α. Thus, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
To complete the framework, consider the evidence regarding
the propositions. Let PS denote a probability measure over the
Boolean algebra B such that PS (A) is the probability (e.g., belief or other evidential support) that A contains the true proposition, and let pS denote the associated mass function. The
expected epistemic utility is
Eφα (A)

= [1 − qPR (A)]PS (A) − qPR (A)[1 − PS (A)]
= PS (A) − qPR (A).

(11)

It is now evident that expected epistemic utility is maximized
by the largest element of B for which the probability of truth is
as least as great as q times the informational value of rejection.
Thus, expected epistemic utility is maximized by rejecting all
and only those elements of U for which pS (u) < qpR (u).
Here, q may be interpreted as the index of caution. As q increases, the agent rejects more propositions and becomes more
willing to risk error in the interest of obtaining more information.
To illustrate the application of Levi’s theory, suppose X
were to consider three hypotheses to explain some observed
symptoms: u1 = “indigestion”, u2 = “food poisoning”, and
u3 = “ulcer”. Suppose X’s belief regarding the truth of these
three hypotheses are pS (u1 ) = 0.8, pS (u2 ) = pS (u3 ) = 0.1.
Also, suppose X2 considers u2 to be twice as informationally valuable as u1 , and u3 to be ten times as informationally valuable as u1 . A reasonable way to compute the informational value of rejection is to define pR (ui ) as the normalized reciprocal of the informational value of retention, yielding pR (u1 ) = 0.625, pR (u2 ) = 0.3125, and pR (u3 ) = 0.0625.
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Setting q = 1, only u1 and u3 are retained. Even though u1
is by far the most likely cause of the symptoms, u3 is not rejected, because the informational value of that hypothesis requires a great deal of evidence that it is not the correct hypothesis before it can be eliminated from consideration. Hypothesis
u2 , on the other hand, is not sufficiently important, even if true,
to be retained as a serious possibility.
In the interest of avoiding error while acquiring information,
X is more conservative than an agent demanding a unique resolution in the interest of seeking only the truth. With the erroravoiding approach, the probability of error is 0.1, and with the
truth-seeking approach, the probability of error is either 0.2
or 0.9. Of course, the price paid for avoiding error is that X
does not achieve a unique resolution of the issue. Nevertheless,
by rejecting the hypotheses for which the informational value
of rejection exceeds the probability of being true, the retained
hypotheses can be used to guide the search for additional evidence to narrow the decision to a single hypothesis.
Satisficing Theory
An epistemologist makes decisions to gain information,
while a praxeologist makes decisions to achieve goals (success). The analogue to a set of epistemological propositions
is a set of possible actions. The degree to which the objective
is not achieved is the degree of failure, and the analogue to
error-avoidance is failure-avoidance. While Levi’s formalism
for optimal error-avoidance is motivated by a lack of sufficient
information to justify a unique answer, it is also well suited to
the analogous praxeological situation of having several possible actions that can be justified as being adequate.
Transitioning from the epistemological to the praxeological
requires an appropriate analogue to the informational value of
rejection. Informational value is a resource that is conserved
if the proposition is rejected and consumed if a proposition is
retained. For example, if a proposition with little monetary
value (and consequently a high informational value of rejection) were rejected, the agent would conserve its monetary resource. Similarly, if an expensive act (e.g., one that cost a great
deal of money) were rejected, the agent would not expend the
corresponding money—it would be conserved. By rejecting
an act, the agent effectively conserves the associated resource
(such as monetary costs, damage to needful equipment, exposure to hazards, loss of social status, consumption of energy,
risk to personnel, etc.). Thus, whereas the intent of the epistemologist is to acquire information while avoiding error, the
intent of the praxeologist is to conserve resources while avoiding failure.
Many theorists (e.g., [28–31]) have argued that it is unwise
to aggregate conflicting interests into a single preference ordering. Some have asserted that in a social setting individuals
have two selves. These selves are similar to the “facets” or “aspects” of a self as defined by [32], who maintain that an agent,
although an indivisible unit, nevertheless is capable of considering his or her choice from different points of view, and that
separate utilities may be defined to correspond to each facet of
an individual. A natural way to classify attributes is according to their effectiveness and efficiency. Each individual Xi
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may be viewed as being composed of two selves: the selecting
self, denoted Si , who evaluates actions in terms of effectiveness without concern for efficiency, and the rejecting self, denoted Ri , who evaluates actions in terms of efficiency, without
concern for effectiveness. When viewed simultaneously from
both perspectives, the agent is denoted as the concatenation of
these two selves, i.e., Xi = Si Ri .
Praxeological interpretations may now be given to the utility functions pRi and pSi , which are mass functions and, hence,
marginal social utilities. For each ui ∈ Ui , pSi (ui ) is a measure of the effectiveness of ui , and we call it the selectability
mass function. The relationship pSi (ui ) > pSi (u′i ) means that
ui is more effective than u′i in terms of avoiding failure. Similarly, pRi (ui ) is a measure of the inefficiency of ui , and we
refer to it as the rejectability mass function. The relationship
pRi (ui ) > pRi (u′i ) means that ui is less efficient than u′i in
terms of conserving resources. The set
Σiq = {ui ∈ Ui : pSi (ui ) ≥ qi pRi (ui )}

(12)

constitutes the set of actions for which effectiveness, as measured by the selectability function, is at least as great as qi
times the inefficiency, as measured by the rejectability function. The set Σiq is called the satisficing set for Xi . The praxeological interpretation of qi is a measure of caution, as before.
As qi increases, so does the number of actions that are rejected,
indicating that the agent is increasingly willing to risk failure in
the interest of conserving resources. As will become more apparent in the multi-agent case, an appropriate interpretation of
qi is as an index of negotiation, since lowering qi enlarges the
satisficing set, thereby increasing the opportunities for reaching a compromise. Of course, lowering qi is tantamount to Xi
lowering its standards of what is deemed to be acceptable.
The most fundamental way the error-avoidance formulation differs from the classical optimization formulation is that,
whereas the classical formulation involves comparisons of a
single attribute (utility) between multiple actions to identify
the best one, the error-avoidance formulation involves comparisons between multiple attributes (effectiveness and efficiency)
for each action to decide whether or not to reject.
To motivate this alternative concept of decision making,
consider three separate notions: superlative, comparative, and
positive. Much of human decision making employs one of
these notions. Individual rationality is an example of the superlative, where decision makers make global comparisons of
their options and choose the best one. In contrast, heuristic
decision making is an example of the positive, where decision
makers rely upon the belief that a rule that has worked in the
past will also work well in the future (e.g., rule-based expert
systems). Although economic, psychological, philosophical,
engineering, and computer science literatures are replete with
discussions of these two notions, they are relatively silent regarding decision making that is comparative, even though people often seem to work toward a decision by first eliminating
bad choices before settling on acceptable ones. They compare
the pros versus the cons, upsides versus downsides, benefits
versus costs, etc. This way of making decisions is more primitive than a total rank-ordering of options (superlative), but is
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more sophisticated than simply following heuristic rules (positive). The idea of viewing an action from two perspectives—
one focused on the positive consequences of adopting it and
the second focused on the negative consequences—is a powerful concept, and one for which a mathematically rigorous
formalization is long overdue.
Just as the colloquial notion of achieving “the best and only
the best” is useful once it has been mathematically formalized
as maximizing utility, the colloquial notion of “getting one’s
money’s worth” is useful once it is formalized. The difference
between these two concepts is significant: the former is intrinsically an individual enterprise, while, as shall be shown,
the latter can be extended naturally to groups and individuals
simultaneously.
The term satisficing was originally introduced by Simon
[33] as a type of bounded rationality. He proposed to halt
searching for the optimal solution when the expected improvement is insufficient to justify the costs of continuing to search.
The halting criterion is a heuristically defined aspiration level.
Thus satisficing, in Simon’s sense, is firmly rooted in individual rationality and is a heuristic approximation to utility maximization.
The failure-avoidance formulation motivates a new and
mathematically precise definition of satisficing. Reducing the
set of non-rejected alternatives to the minimum eliminates as
many options as possible; each of the remaining alternatives
is “good enough” in the sense that its effectiveness outweighs
its inefficiency. Satisficing decisions are optimal in that they
eliminate the maximum number of failure-prone actions. Thus,
satisficing agents are optimal failure-avoiders. Furthermore, if
they succeed in eliminating all but one action, they will become optimizers in the classical sense (as Stirling [34] has
shown, an optimal solution is also a satisficing solution). Thus,
rather than a heuristic approximation to classical optimization,
satisficing is a generalization of classical optimization.
To illustrate the satisficing way of making decisions, suppose that X is in the market for a new automobile and must
choose from among five alternatives, denoted A through E.
Three criteria are considered: performance, reliability, and affordability. Table 1 displays the utility of each of the vehicles
for each of these attributes.
Table 1: Utility of vehicle attributes.
Vehicle
u
A
B
C
D
E

Performance
p(u)
3
5
2
1
4

Reliability
r(u)
1
3
4
5
2

Affordability
a(u)
5
1
4
3
2

The optimizer’s formulation of this multi-attribute decision
problem is to demand the best deal by defining a utility function to be maximized. Assuming that X weights the three at-
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tributes equally in importance, a global utility may be formed
as the sum of the three attribute-level utilities, yielding
φ(u) = p(u) + r(u) + a(u)

(13)

for each u ∈ {A, B, C, D, E}, as displayed in the second column of Table 2. Clearly, the unique optimal option is C. But
demanding the best deal is not the only way to frame the problem. Another way is for X to demand to get its money’s worth.
This formulation does not involve making inter-vehicle comparisons; rather, it involves intra-vehicle comparisons of attributes for each alternative. To make these comparisons, X
requires operational definitions of selectability and rejectability. Accordingly, X identifies performance and reliability as
selecting attributes, and cost as a rejecting attribute. The values associated with these attributes are combined, normalized,
and tabulated in the last two columns of Table 2 (the ordering on the affordability attribute has been reversed to convert
it to cost). Setting q = 1, selectability exceeds rejectability for
options A and C, selectability equals rejectability for D, and
rejectability exceeds selectability for B and E.

Global Utility
φ(u)
9
9
10
9
8

Selectability
pS (u)
0.133
0.267
0.200
0.200
0.200

pS
C

D

MULTI-AGENT SATISFICING

q=1
B

The Interdependence Function

Rejectability
pR (u)
0.067
0.333
0.133
0.200
0.267

Figure 1 provides a cross plot of selectability versus rejectability as u is varied over its domain, with pR the abscissa and pS the ordinate. The diagonal line corresponding
to q = 1 constitutes a threshold dividing the satisficing and
non-satisficing alternatives. Although both C and D are satisficing, D costs more than C without offering increased benefit.
As will be discussed, C dominates D. Thus, options A and C
are the non-dominated satisficing solutions.
6

optimal solution is also satisficing. A key difference between
these two methods is that the satisficing approach provides insight into the attributes of all alternatives, while the optimal
approach focuses exclusively on identifying the best solution
without distinguishing between non-optimal alternatives. For
example, although A and B have the same global utility, they
are not equal in terms of satisficing: one gives X its money’s
worth, while the other does not. Of course, at the moment
of truth, X must decide between A and C. Since satisficing
decision theory is not designed to provide a unique solution,
ancillary criteria must be evoked to make a final choice. Ways
to do this will be discussed subsequently.
In the single-agent case, satisficing theory sheds new light
on the decision problem, but is otherwise of limited interest. Its
real power becomes evident when extended to multi-agent systems. Classical theory interprets optimality in terms of unique
solutions, but in the case of multi-agent decisions this insistence overreaches: the number of different perspectives makes
it logically impossible to choose a single best solution from
considerations internal to the group. In contrast, the satisficing approach preserves opportunities for negotiation and compromise by preserving a set of adequate choices rather than
selecting a single “best” solution. As shall be established, it
is possible for a group and all its members to obtain optimal
error-avoiding solutions.
To ensure well-formedness, the concepts of effectiveness
and efficiency must not be re-statements of the same attribute. Consequently, for a single-agent decision problem, it is reasonable to assume that the selectability of an
attribute should not depend on its rejectability, and vice
versa. Thus, S and R are praxeologically independent.
In a multi-agent setting, however, the interaction between
one agent’s efficiency/effectiveness and another agent’s efficiency/effectiveness can generate praxeological dependencies
between the various selves of a society. Thus, in group settings, the selectability and rejectability measures associated
with effectiveness and efficiency cannot be specified independently of each other. A critical aspect of modeling the behavior of a multi-agent society, therefore, is the representation of
the interdependence of both effectiveness and efficiency of all
possible joint actions that could be undertaken.

Table 2: Global performance and selectability/rejectability
functions.
Vehicle
u
A
B
C
D
E

129

E

A

pR
Figure 1: Cross-plot of selectability versus rejectability.
This example illustrates the fact that, when the same criteria
are used to define both the optimal and satisficing solutions, the

Let G = {X1 , . . . , Xn } be a society of n agents with
joint action space U = U1 × · · · × Un . Let GS =
{S1 , . . . , Sn } denote the collection of selecting selves, and
let GR = {R1 , . . . , Rn } denote the collection of rejecting selves. Then an equivalent representation of the society in terms of the selecting and rejecting selves is GSR =
{S1 · · · Sn R1 · · · Rn }. Let G′ = {Xi1 , . . . , Xik } be a subsociety of G. Expressed in terms of the corresponding selves,
G′SR = {Si1 · · · Sik Ri1 · · · Rik }. The interdependence function of G is a mass function of 2n variables of the form
pGSR (u; v) where u, v ∈ U. It is sometimes useful to employ the equivalent notation pS1 ···Sn R1 ···Rn (u; v). Also, the
interdependence function of the sub-society G′ is of the form

130

The Open Cybernetics and Systemics Journal, 2008, Volume 2

pG′SR (u′ ; v′ ), where u′ , v′ ∈ U′ = Ui1 × · · · × Uik .
The interdependence function is a social utility, as defined
earlier, that accounts for all possible effectiveness and efficiency relationships that exist between the selves involved in
a multi-agent decision problem. It does this in the same way
that a multivariate probability mass function accounts for all
statistical dependencies between multiple random phenomena.
Thus, to formulate a multi-agent satisficing problem, the key
task is to define the interdependence function.
Efficient Representations
The interdependence function is a mass function and may
be most simply represented by factoring it into the product of
conditional and marginal mass functions. Graph theory is a
powerful way to express this factorization. In particular, the
flow of influence between selves may be expressed by a praxeic network, that is, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) analogous
to a Bayesian network (e.g., see [35, 36]). A praxeic network
for n agents comprises 2n vertices (one for each self), with
edges representing influence relationships (either effectiveness
or efficiency) as modeled by conditional social utilities.
Consider the praxeic network of the three-agent system displayed in Figure 2. The parents of a vertex V , denoted pa (V ),
is the set of vertices that influence it. By inspection it is seen
that S1 = pa (S2 ) = pa (S3 ) = pa (R2 ) and S2 = pa (R1 ) =
pa (R3 ). If a vertex V has no parents, the pa (V ) = ∅.
The children of a vertex V , denoted ch (V ), is the set of
vertices that are directly influenced by V . Thus, ch (S1 ) =
{S2 , S3 , R2 } and ch (S2 ) = {R1 , R3 }. The descendants
de (V ) of V is the set of all vertices that are influenced, directly or indirectly (via children, children’s children, etc.) by
the given vertex. Thus, de (S1 ) = {S2 , S3 , R1 , R2 , R3 }, and
de (S2 ) = ch (S2 ).
S1
pS2 |S1

S2
pR1 |S2

R1

pR |S
pS3 |S1 2 1

S3

R2

pR3 |S2

R3
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children. The interdependence function thus has the form
pS1 ...Sn R1 ...Rn (u1 , . . . , un ; v1 , . . . , vn ) =


Qn
i=1 pSi | pa (Si ) ui | pa (ui ) pRi | pa (Ri ) vi | pa (vi ) ,(14)

where, if pa (Si ) = ∅, then pSi | pa (Si ) (ui | pa (ui )) =
pSi (ui ), the unconditional marginal social utility. The interdependence function corresponding to the DAG illustrated in
Figure 2 is
pS1 S2 S3 R1 R2 R3 (u1 , u2 , u3 ; v1 , v2 , v3 ) =
pS1 (u1 ) · pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pS3 |S1 (u3 |u1 ) ·
pR1 |S2 (v1 |u2 ) · pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pR3 |S2 (v3 |u2 ).

For societies that can be characterized by marginal and conditional social utilities defined over small clusters of individuals, a graphical representation provides a convenient way to
construct a global society model from local relationships. An
important advantage of viewing a multi-agent satisficing decision problem in terms of graph theory is that it leads to computationally efficient algorithms such as Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm [35] for computing the selectability and rejectability functions for the society, any sub-society, or any individual. Although Cooper [38] proved that the computational
complexity of a general Bayesian network is NP-hard, many
interesting networks will involve only sparsely linked vertices,
in which case the published algorithms offer tractable performance.
Satisficing Games
A satisficing game, as defined by Stirling [34], is a triple
(G, U, pGSR ). Given the game scenario, the first step is to
identify operational definitions of selectability or rejectability
for each of the 2n selves in an n player game. The next step is
to define the relationships that exist between the various selves
and to construct the praxeic network that consequently defines
the interdependence function. Once the interdependence function is defined, the selectability and rejectability functions of
the society and all sub-societies may be obtained by marginalization.
The joint selectability and rejectability mass functions of a
society G are given as
pGS (u)

=

pGSR (u; v)

(15)

pGSR (u; v)

(16)

{v}

Figure 2: A praxeic network for a three-agent society.
pGR (v)
The key property of DAGs is the Markov property: nondescendant non-parents of a vertex are conditionally independent of the vertex, given the state of its parent vertices. This
property may be used to prove the equivalence of a DAG
whose edges are conditional mass functions with a joint mass
function for all of the vertices in the graph (for a proof, see
[35, 37]). Thus, if local influence relationships can be expressed with a directed acyclic graph, then the influence relationships can be represented by conditional mass functions
where the dependencies flow in only one way: from parents to

X

=

X
{u}

and, for any sub-society G′ of G, the corresponding marginal
selectability and rejectability social utilities are, for u′ ∈ U′
(in the not-sum notation introduced in Theorem 1),
X
pGS (u)
(17)
pG′S (u′ ) =
¬{u′ }

pG′R (u′ ) =

X

¬{u′ }

pGR (u).

(18)
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In particular, the individual marginal selectability and rejectability mass functions are, for i = 1, . . . , n,
X
pGS (u)
(19)
pSi (ui ) =
¬{ui }

pRi (ui ) =

X

pGR (u).

(20)

¬{ui }

Once the marginal selectability and rejectability functions
have been computed, the individually satisficing sets are easily
obtained for each agent as
Σiqi = {ui ∈ Ui : pSi (ui ) ≥ qi pRi (ui ) }

(21)

for i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that each agent may have its own q
value, which controls its openness to negotiation. The Cartesian product of the individually satisficing sets is called the
satisficing rectangle:
RG = Σ1q1 × · · · × Σnqn .

(22)

The satisficing rectangle is the set of all option vectors that
are simultaneously satisficing for all of the individuals. It does
not, however, represent a group preference. The set of option vectors that are jointly satisficing for the group G is computed from the joint selectability and rejectability functions
(15) and (16), and for any sub-society G1 , the corresponding
sub-society selectability and rejectability functions are given
by (17) and (18). For a society G the jointly satisficing set is
ΣG
qG = {u ∈ U: pGS (u) ≥ qG pGR (u)},

(23)

where qG is the q-value for the group. Furthermore, for any
sub-society G1 = G1S G1R , the sub-society satisficing set with
corresponding action subspace U1 is
1

ΣG
q

G1

= {u1 ∈ U1 : pG1S (u1 ) ≥ qG1 pG1R (u1 )}.

(24)

Endogeny and Social Coherence
The satisficing solution concept induces an emergent preference ordering for the society. Define the group preference
s
s
relationship {≻G , ∼G }, where
s

u ≻G u′ if u ∈ ΣG and u′ 6∈ ΣG
s

u ∼G u′ if u, u′ ∈ ΣG or u, u′ 6∈ ΣG

.

(25)

It is important to appreciate that this group-level preference
ordering is determined by the endogenous relationships that
exist among the individuals, and need not correspond to an
externally conceived notion of group functionality. It is an
emergent manifestation of the social welfare of the group as
a function of the way the unconditional and conditional preferences of its members combine. Social welfare, in this sense,
thus accounts for all tendencies for cooperation and competition that exist among the individuals, but is not an aggregation
of individual welfares. Since it is emergent, its exact nature
will generally not be predictable in advance, even for a cooperatively disposed group.
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The individually satisficing sets also induce agent-level
s
s
preference relationships {≻i , ∼i }, where
s

ui ≻i u′i if ui ∈ Σiqi and u′i 6∈ Σiqi
s

ui ∼i u′i if ui , u′i ∈ Σiqi or ui , u′i 6∈ Σiqi

.

(26)

These individual and group preference orderings provide a
means for reconciling group and individual preferences. The
compromise set CG consists of all joint actions that are simultaneously satisficing for the group and for each of its constituent
members, and is defined by the intersection of the jointly satisficing set and the satisficing rectangle:
CG = RG ∩ ΣG
qG .

(27)

This set may be empty, but that is not a weakness of the theory. Rather, it is the recognition that societies can be populated
by individuals who are so diametrically opposed to each other
that they reach an impasse and cannot agree to do anything
jointly satisficing. However, the following weak relationship
always exists between RG and ΣG
qG .
Theorem 2 (The negotiation theorem) Let G be a society
and let G1 and G2 be arbitrary disjoint sub-societies with action subspaces U1 and U2 , respectively. If u1 ∈ ΣG1 and
qG ≤ qG1 , then there exists u∗2 ∈ U2 such that (u1 , u∗2 ) ∈
ΣG1 ∪G2 .
Proof This result is established by the contra-positive,
namely, that if (u1 , u2 ) 6∈ ΣG1 ∪G2 for all u2 ∈ U2 , then
u1 6∈ ΣG1 . Suppose pGS (u1 , u2 ) P
< qG pGR (u1 , u2 ) for
all u2 ∈ U2 . Then pG1S (u1 ) =
{u2 } pGS (u1 , u2 ) <
P
1
qG {u2 } pGR (u1 , u2 ) = qG pGR (u1 ) ≤ qG1 pG1R (u1 ), hence
u1 6∈ ΣG1 .
2
Although this theorem is simple, it is important: it establishes that G1 need not be subjugated in order to accommodate
the interests of the society. In particular, for G1 = {Xi }, every
individual has a seat at the table in the sense that, if an action
is individually satisficing for it, then that action is an element
of at least one jointly satisficing solution. This condition is
perhaps the weakest possible for meaningful negotiations to
occur.
The ability of an agent to adjust its index of negotiation qi
provides a mechanism for autonomously exploring the effects
of constraints on the decision problem. This is an important
new capability. If a given set of constraints leads to a solution
judged to be inadequate, conventional methodologies require
the constraints to be revised by trial-and-error—their effects
cannot be judged without generating a new solution. By representing explicitly the effects of social constraints on group decisions, satisficing game theory makes those constraints available for dynamic modification by the agents themselves, thus
increasing the environmental variability with which the group
can cope. For example, agents may resolve an impasse by relaxing their standards of performance. This may be done by
each player incrementally reducing its qi and re-computing

132

The Open Cybernetics and Systemics Journal, 2008, Volume 2

the compromise set until it becomes non-empty. An important feature of this procedure is that each agent can control its
own standards of performance. Once an agent has reached the
limit of its willingness to reduce its standards, it may hold its
qi value constant. If the compromise set remains empty after
some agent has reduced its qi to its minimum acceptable level,
then an impasse cannot be avoided. Such a society is dysfunctional. However, it may still be possible for some sub-society
to break away from the larger group and continue to negotiate.
The compromise set represents the set of all decision vectors
that are simultaneously acceptable to the group and to each
member. Assuming that, perhaps as a result of negotiation, it
is non-empty, there is no guarantee that it is a singleton; there
may be multiple compromise decisions. The compromise set
can be reduced by first eliminating any satisficing solutions
that are dominated by superior solutions. For every u ∈ U let
BS (u) = {v ∈ U : pR (v) < pR (u) and pS (v) ≥ pS (u)}
BR (u) = {v ∈ U : pR (v) ≤ pR (u) and pS (v) > pS (u)},
(28)
and define the set of alternatives that are strictly better than
u: B(u) = BS (u) ∪ BR (u); that is, B(u) consists of all
possible alternatives that are either less rejectable and not less
selectable than u, or more selectable and not more rejectable
than u. If B(u) = ∅, then no alternative can be preferred to u
in both selectability and rejectability. The non-dominated set
is NG = {u ∈ U : B(u) = ∅}.
The optimal compromise set is
ΩG = NG ∩ CG .

(29)

All elements of the optimal compromise set lay claim
to some notion of optimality.
For example, uM =
arg maxu∈ΩG {pS (u) − qG pR (u)} maximizes the difference
between group selectability and group rejectability; uR =
arg minu∈ΩG pR (u) minimizes group rejectability, and uS =
arg maxu∈ΩG pS (u) maximizes group selectability. The remaining elements of ΩG represent other optimal tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency. If the indices of negotiation
for the agents are sufficiently reduced, an optimal compromise
will eventually exist.
Altruism
Social utilities and the satisficing solution concept provide
a rigorous approach to the longstanding problem of altruism.
While usually understood to mean that one is willing to sacrifice to benefit another, altruism could also take a malevolent
form, in which an agent sacrifices to injure another. In either
case, an altruistic agent by definition takes into consideration
the preferences of others when defining its own preferences.
By design, classical utilities accommodate only self-interest,
and in this framework altruism can be accommodated only by
redefining self-interest. This has proven highly problematic,
not only philosophically but also in practice. It is possible to
simulate benevolence or malevolence in particular situations,
but the redefinition tends to be too specific and context dependent. In particular, it can not distinguish between categorical
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altruism, the willingness to always relinquish one’s own selfinterest, and conditional altruism, a willingness to relinquish
one’s own self-interest if, and only if, (a) the other wishes to
take advantage of the offered largesse (for benevolent altruism), or (b) the other wishes to act in a way that elicits punishment (for malevolent altruism). This more sophisticated expression of altruism is simply not possible with classical utilities, since they are functions of possible player actions, not
preferences for action.
In contrast, a socially rational agent may dynamically adjust
its preferences as a function of the preferences of others. For
example, suppose X1 were willing to defer to X2 by preferring
u′1 if X2 were to prefer u′2 , otherwise, X1 would prefer u′′1 .
This accommodation can be implemented by setting
 (

1 u1 = u′1 , u2 = u′2





0 u1 6= u′1 , u2 = u′2
.
(30)
pS1 |S2 (u1 |u2 ) =
(

′
′

,
u
=
6
u
0
u
=
u
2
1

2
1



1 u1 = u′′1 , u2 6= u′2

Conditional social utilities permit the agent to examine each
possible hypothetical situation and adjust its preferences as if
the other agent actually most preferred to select or reject each
of its possible alternatives. These specifications can be determined before the actual preferences of X2 become available to
X1 . Once pP
S2 is given, X1 ’s marginal selectability becomes
pS1 (u1 ) =
u2 pS1 |S2 (u1 |u2 )pS2 (u2 ), which takes into account both its own and X2 ’s preferences. From this construction it is clear that, if X2 does not strongly prefer u′2 , then X1 ’s
preferences are essentially unaltered. In this way, X1 considers X2 ’s preferences but does not need to “throw the game”
categorically in order to demonstrate a willingness to give deference to X2 .
THE ULTIMATUM GAME

The Ultimatum game is a much-studied example of a simple social relationship where it is difficult to reconcile observed
behavior with the classical game-theoretic solution [5, 39–42].
In this two-player game, a proposer X1 offers a responder X2
a fraction of a sum of money, and X2 chooses whether to accept (in which case the two divide the money as proposed) or
to refuse (in which case neither player receives anything). In
either case, the game is over. Within the framework of classical
game theory, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium solution
is for X1 to offer the smallest possible non-zero amount, and
for X2 to accept what is offered. Interestingly, such a strategy
is rarely adopted by human decision makers. Proposers are inclined to offer fair deals and responders are inclined to reject
unfair deals.
Ultimatum is relevant to the multi-agent systems community as, for example, a model of bargaining and negotiation for
various applications including electronic commerce [43]. Because of its simplicity, the game has become a prototype for
decision problems where social behavior is not adequately explained by the hypothesis of individual rationality.
In an attempt to bring the classical game-theoretic results
into line with experimental results, researchers in behavioral
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economics have proposed to alter the payoff for the Ultimatum game by modifying the utility functions. For example,
Fehr and Schmidt [22] augment utility by non-pecuniary terms
that account for both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity, and show that, with this modified utility, it is possible
to achieve equilibria that are “fair” from the perspectives of
both players. Their approach fundamentally changes the game,
however, because the players adopt new utility functions that
categorically re-define their preferences. As Sen observed: “It
is possible to define a person’s interests in such a way that no
matter what he does he can be seen to be furthering his own
interests in every act of choice . . . no matter whether you are
a single-minded egoist or a raving altruist or a class-conscious
militant, you will appear to be maximizing your own utility in
this enchanted world of definitions” [44, p. 29].
The following analysis demonstrates that a socially rational
formulation of the game provides a natural way to incorporate
social attributes directly into the game description. It does not
rely on an ad hoc redefinition of utility functions that, by their
structure, are designed only for individually rational agents.
Although the model makes specific predictions about behavior,
we do not claim that this represents actual human behavior.
Classical Formulation of the Ultimatum Game
The action set for the proposer of the original Ultimatum game is a continuum (the unit interval). Fortunately,
the minigame of Gale et al. [45], in which the proposer can
make only one of two offers, preserves Ultimatum’s essence
while simplifying the analysis. Let Xi have the action set
Ui = {ui , u′i }, and let Si and Ri denote the respective selecting and rejecting selves for i = 1, 2. Let X1 ’s two offers be h
and ℓ (high and low), with 0 < ℓ ≪ h ≤ 12 , corresponding to
the fraction of the fortune offered to X2 . The responder’s options are a (accept) and r (refuse). The standard payoff matrix
for this minigame is displayed in Table 3. The unique Nash
equilibrium is for X1 to play ℓ and X2 to play a.
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Satisficing Formulation of the Ultimatum Game
To frame Ultimatum as a satisficing game, the payoff matrix
must be replaced with a social utility function that accounts for
the preferences of the four selves involved: S1 , S2 , R1 , and
R2 . In this formulation the intemperance of X1 and the indignation of X2 are the dominant social attributes of the players.
These attributes are denoted by an intemperance index τ and
an indignation index δ, respectively, where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The condition τ ≈ 1 means that X1 is extremely
avaricious, while τ ≈ 12 means that X1 is willing to restrain
its desire for wealth. The condition δ ≈ 1 means that X2 is
easily offended, while δ ≈ 0 means that X2 is easily pleased.
For the present purpose, assume that these parameters are fixed
properties of the players. X1 may temper its avarice because
of benevolence toward X2 , because of an aversion to inequity,
or because of suspicion that X2 may refuse an unfair offer—
the precise motive is not important here. The key point is that
the parameters are treated as endogenous attributes, not the result of exogenous forces that cause the players to change their
utilities.
There is not a unique way to define the selecting and rejecting selves S1 , S2 , R1 , and R2 of the players, but it is reasonable to associate the selecting self with the goal of the game,
which is to receive as much of the fortune as possible. The
rejecting self is associated with the efficiency with which the
goal is pursued. This attribute, however, must be independent
of effectiveness, and hence cannot be a function of the ratio
of the fortune one receives. It must therefore be a function of
whether or not any reward is received. Thus, both players are
inefficient if, and only if, the responder refuses the offer.
Since X1 plays first, X1 ’s utility structure need not be conditioned on X2 ’s response (although this remains a possibility).
Thus, X1 ’s social utilities are unconditional. S1 ’s selectability
(as a function of intemperance) is expressed as
pS1 (h) = 1 − τ

and pS1 (ℓ) = τ.

(31)

S1 ’s rejectability is a function of X2 ’s indignation as well as
its own intemperance, and is expressed as
Table 3: Payoff matrix for the Ultimatum minigame.
X1
h
ℓ

X2
a
r
(1 − h, h) (0, 0)
(1 − ℓ, ℓ) (0, 0)

pR1 (h) = τ (1 − δ) and pR1 (ℓ) = 1 − τ (1 − δ);

that is, if X2 were highly indignant (δ ≈ 1), offering the high
fraction to the responder would have low rejectability.
Since X2 makes the second move, the preferences of X2 ’s
selves will be conditioned on X1 ’s choice. Define pS2 |S1 as
pS2 |S1 (a|h) = 1 and pS2 |S1 (r|h) = 0.

In the classical formulation, social coherence can be violated by the exogenous imposition of a social preference. For
example, there is strong empirical evidence that groups reveal
a preference for fair treatment [46, 47]. In the minigame, individual rationality dictates that ℓ ≻1 h. If fair treatment is
imposed on the minigame then (h, a) ≻G (ℓ, a) and (h, r) G
(ℓ, r). Since X1 ’s preference is never preferred by the group,
social coherence is violated. In this case at least, empirical
behavior appears to be more consistent with social coherence
than with individual rationality.

(32)

(33)

If, however, S1 were to select ℓ, then S2 would be indignant
and would prefer to select r with weight δ and a with weight
1 − δ. Thus,
pS2 |S1 (a|ℓ) = 1 − δ

and pS2 |S1 (r|ℓ) = δ.

(34)

Next consider X2 ’s rejecting self, R2 . If S1 were to select
h, then R2 would prefer to reject r. Thus,
pR2 |S1 (a|h) = 0 and pR2 |S1 (r|h) = 1.
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If S1 were to select ℓ, then R2 would be indignant and would
prefer to reject a with weight δ and r with weight 1 − δ. Thus,
pR2 |S1 (a|ℓ) = δ

and pR2 |S1 (r|ℓ) = 1 − δ.

The resulting two-agent interdependence function can be
factored according to the chain rule of probability. In general,
there are many ways to apply this rule, but for this application,
an obvious factorization is

Archibald et al.

Now recall that the satisficing set for a decision maker is
the set of actions for which the selectability is at least as great
as the product of q, the index of caution, and the rejectability.
Thus, setting q = 1 and comparing (31) with (32) and (37)
with (38), the satisficing sets for the proposer and responder
are
Σ1 (τ, δ) =

pS1 S2 R1 R2 (u1 , u2 ; v1 , v2 ) = pS2 |S1 R1 R2 (u2 |u1 ; v1 , v2 )
·pR1 |S1 R2 (v1 |u1 ; v2 ) · pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 ). (35)
Consider each of the factors on the right hand side of (35) in
turn. In the Ultimatum game, S2 ’s conditional preferences depend only on the choice S1 makes and are not influenced by
R1 or R2 , so pS2 |S1 R1 R2 reduces to pS2 |S1 . Because R1 is not
influenced by any other self, the term pR1 |S1 R2 may be replaced
by pR1 . The final terms are already in a form defined by the
game model. Substituting the simplified terms into (35) yields

=
Σ2 (τ, δ) =
=

pS1 S2 R1 R2 (u1 , u2 ; v1 , v2 ) =
pS1 (u1 ) · pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pR1 (v1 ) · pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ).(36)
The Ultimatum game provides an opportunity for categorical altruism by the proposer, and conditional altruism by the
responder [see (31)]. If the proposer is purely selfish or completely intemperate (τ = 1), no deference would be shown for
the responder’s welfare (or no concern for retaliation). However, if τ < 1, the proposer accommodates the preferences of
the responder (or acts to reduce the potential for retaliation)
at its own expense. The responder exhibits malevolent conditional altruism (to the degree defined by δ) by sacrificing its
own welfare to punish the proposer for an unfair offer [see
(34)]. But if the proposer makes a fair offer, then the responder’s utility function reflects acceptance [see (33)].
The Ultimatum minigame is such that its marginals are easily computed without resorting to a formal algorithm. Applying (15) and (16), then (19) and (20) in sequence, the selectability and rejectability marginals for the responder are
XXX
pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pR1 (v1 ) ·
pS2 (u2 ) =
{u1 } {v1 } {v2 }

pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 )

=

pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 )

{u1 }

=



1 − τδ
τδ

for u2 = a
for u2 = r

(37)

and
pR2 (v2 )

=

X XX

=

pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 )

τδ
1 − τδ

τ=
IV

1
2−δ

III
r
a

ℓ
h

0.6

τ
0.4

II

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

δ

Figure 3 displays the satisficing rectangle for the Ultimatum
game as a function of τ and δ. Values of τ and δ that lie above
1
the curve labeled τ = 2−δ
(regions I and IV ) result in the
proposer offering a low fraction, and values that lie below this
curve result in a high fraction. For (τ, δ) pairs that lie on the
line, both h and ℓ are satisficing for the proposer. Next, consider the responder. Values of τ and δ that lie above the curve
1
(regions III and IV ) result in the responder
labeled τ = 2δ
refusing the offer, and values that lie below this curve result in
accepting the offer. For (τ, δ) pairs that lie on the line, both
a and r are satisficing for the responder. The two curves divide the (τ, δ) square into four regions, corresponding to four
different satisficing rectangles (ignoring boundaries):
=
=

{u1 }



1
2δ

I

0.8

RG (τ, δ)

pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 )

=

τ=

1

pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pR1 (v1 ) ·

{u1 } {u2 } {v1 }

X

{u2 ∈ U2 : pS2 (u) ≥ pR2 (u1 )}

1

if τ < 2δ
 {a}
1
.
{r}
if τ > 2δ

 {a, r} if τ = 1
2δ

Figure 3: (τ, δ) regions for the satisficing rectangles.

The Satisficing Rectangle

X

{u1 ∈ U1 : pS1 (u) ≥ pR1 (u1 )}

1

if τ < 2−δ
 {h}
1
{ℓ}
if τ > 2−δ

 {h, ℓ} if τ = 1
2−δ

for v2 = a
.
for v2 = r

(38)

Σ1 (τ, δ) × Σ2 (τ, δ)


 {(ℓ, a)} for (τ, δ) ∈ I

{(h, a)} for (τ, δ) ∈ II
.
{(h, r)} for (τ, δ) ∈ III



{(ℓ, r)} for (τ, δ) ∈ IV

In region I, a low fraction is offered and accepted, which is
the Nash solution. It obtains when the proposer is intemperate and the responder is not readily indignant. In region II,
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a high fraction is offered and accepted. This solution obtains
when the proposer is temperate and the responder reasonable.
In region III, a high fraction is offered and refused, revealing
an unreasonable indignation on the part of the responder. In
region IV , a low offer is refused, since the responder is indignant in the face of an intemperate proposer.

1

τ

pR1 R2 (v1 , v2 ) =

{u1 } {u2 }

·pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 ).

The resulting joint selectability and joint rejectability functions
are
pS1 S2 (h, a) =

1−τ

pS1 S2 (h, r) =
pS1 S2 (ℓ, a) =

0
τ − τδ

pS1 S2 (ℓ, r)

τδ

=

F
0.4

G

0.2

ΣG (τ, δ) =
{(u1 , u2 ) ∈ U1 × U2 : pS1 S2 (u1 , u2 ) ≥ pR1 R2 (u1 , u2 )},

·pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) · pS1 (u1 )
XX
pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pR1 (v1 )

E

0.6

The satisficing set for a society constitutes all joint actions
that are good enough for the society collectively. For the Ultimatum game with q = 1,

{v1 } {v2 }

C
D

0.8

Group Satisficing Solutions

where the joint selectability and joint rejectability mass functions are computed as
XX
pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) · pR1 (v1 )
pS1 S2 (u1 , u2 ) =

B

A
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1
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Figure 4: (τ, δ) regions for the jointly satisficing sets.
and (ℓ, r) are jointly satisficing for the (τ, δ) values in that
region (high intemperance, low to moderate indignation). The
society, if it were to act as a single entity, would not reject
either of these joint actions—either would be good enough.
It is important to understand that a jointly satisficing set is a
purely context-free mathematical result that need not have an
obvious operational interpretation, but it is certainly possible
to impose one. For regions A, F , and G, a group preference
to obtain the fortune can be deduced. For region E, there is
a group preference to be fair. For region D a possible group
preference is to at least do something that is logical (such as
not punishing without cause). For region C, the only possible
group preference is to be dysfunctional. Region B amounts to
indifference.
Compromise
By inspection, the compromise set for the Ultimatum game
is

and
pR1 R2 (h, a) =

τ 2 δ − τ 2 δ2

pR1 R2 (h, r) =
pR1 R2 (ℓ, a) =

τ − τ δ − τ 2 δ + τ 2 δ2
τ δ − τ 2 δ + τ 2 δ2

pR1 R2 (ℓ, r)

1 − τ + τ 2 δ − τ 2 δ2 .

=

Setting q = 1, the jointly satisficing set for the group is obtained by comparing the above functions for each joint action.
Figure 4 displays this set as a function of τ and δ as defined by

{(ℓ, a)}
for (τ, δ) ∈ A




{(ℓ,
a),
(ℓ,
r)}
for
(τ, δ) ∈ B




for (τ, δ) ∈ C
 {(ℓ, r)}
{(ℓ, a), (ℓ, r), (h, a)} for (τ, δ) ∈ D .
ΣG (τ, δ) =


{(ℓ, r), (h, a)}
for (τ, δ) ∈ E




{(h,
a),
(ℓ,
a)}
for
(τ, δ) ∈ F



{(h, a)}
for (τ, δ) ∈ G
Notice that regions B, D, E, and F do not have unique
solutions. In region B, for example, both joint actions (ℓ, a)

CG (τ, δ) = RG (τ, δ) ∩ ΣG (τ, δ)

(ℓ, a) for (τ, δ) ∈ I ∩ (A ∪ B ∪ D ∪ F ) = I \ E



(h, a) for (τ, δ) ∈ II ∩ (E ∪ F ∪ G) = II
.
=
for (τ, δ) ∈ (III ∪ I) ∩ E
 ∅


(ℓ, r) for (τ, δ) ∈ IV ∩ (B ∪ C ∪ E) = IV

Figure 5 displays the (τ, δ) regions that correspond to joint
actions in the compromise set. For all (τ, δ) 6∈ (III ∪ I) ∩ E,
there is a unique pair of individual choices consistent with the
society’s choice—an optimal compromise. It is possible to
operationalize society/individual satisficing for each of these
joint actions. For joint actions (h, a) and (ℓ, a), the optimal
compromise is to share the fortune. For the joint action (ℓ, r),
it is to be dysfunctional—players are so mismatched in temperament that failure cannot be avoided. The joint action (h, r) is
never a compromise solution.
COORDINATED GRAPH SEARCH

A team of mobile autonomous agents is tasked to visit all of
the nodes of an undirected graph whose edges represent paths
between the nodes. Each agent possesses a copy of the graph
and is able to communicate with other agents within a speci-
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Recall that the aim of the decision maker (individual or group)
is to conserve resources (associated with rejectability) while
avoiding failure (associated with selectability). In the context
of this game, failure occurs if one or more nodes are not visited, and resources are consumed if connectivity is lost.

1

(ℓ, r)
0.8

(ℓ, a)

∅
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∅

0.6
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Figure 5: (τ, δ) regions for the compromise set.
fied radius. As long as the group maintains full communication connectivity (relaying messages if necessary), every agent
will be continuously updated regarding which nodes have been
visited. The performance criteria for this society is that (a) all
nodes are visited by at least one agent such that duplication is
kept small, and (b) full communication connectivity is maintained. It is assumed that the agents are homogeneous, the
nodes are of equal value to the search effort, and the communication range is identical for all agents. When at a node, an
agent’s option set consists of the node it is at and all adjacent
nodes. While on an edge, its option set will consist of the
nodes that define the edge.
This scenario can be viewed as a generalized n-agent version of the classic traveling salesman problem, the complexity
of which grows combinatorically with the number of nodes.
The computational complexity of an optimal solution to this
n-agent problem grows even faster, since it depends on the
number of nodes in the graph, the number of agents, and the
need to satisfy the communication constraint. Although it is
impractical to compute the optimal solution, there are many
ways to formulate a satisficing solution.
The Social Model
Since the search scenario is dynamic, the associated social
utilities must evolve in time as agents make decisions and traverse the graph. It is assumed that time flows in discrete steps
at each time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , and that each agent has knowledge of the positions of all agents as well as the status of all
nodes (visited or not visited) up to time t − 1. Thus, the social
utilities for this problem will be functions of time as well as of
the options.
Many social models could be defined to characterize this
application. In contrast with the Ultimatum game, in which
behavior is conditioned on the preferences of others, we employ two social models—one for the group and one for the
individuals—and identify solutions that are consistent with
both. This approach demonstrates the versatility of the satisficing approach to group and individual decision making.
Although two separate models are employed, both use the
same operational definitions of selectability and rejectability.

The individual model requires each agent to calculate its selectability and rejectability marginals at each time t using only
knowledge of the state of the system (i.e., agent positions and
node status) but without explicitly accounting for the future
preferences of other agents. Because the calculations are simple, each agent can determine the satisficing sets for all agents
and hence the entire satisficing rectangle at each time t.
Individual selectability pSi for each agent is determined as
follows. If the option set contains unvisited nodes, then

1 if u has been visited prior to time t
pSi (u; t) ∝
,
5 if u has not been visited prior to time t
where the symbol ∝ implies that the values are normalized to
become mass functions. If there are no unvisited nodes in the
agent’s option set, the agent performs a breadth-first search of
the nodes connected to each of the nodes in its action set. Each
such action u is then weighted based on the depth, D(u), of
the first unvisited node encountered if u is adopted. A smaller
depth will receive a larger weight. These weights are then normalized across the action space, yielding
pSi (u; t) ∝

1
.
D(u)

(39)

Since it is associated with the loss of connectivity, the rejectability of an action for agent Xi should be a function of
the current distance dic between Xi and its nearest neighbor.
If taking action u causes dic to approach dmax , the maximum
communication range, the rejectability must increase sharply
in order to avoid communication failure. Let di (u) denote the
distance between Xi and its nearest neighbor that will result if
action u is taken. A simple mechanism to increase rejectability
in proportion to the propensity of an option to result in communication failure is
pRi (u; t) ∝ 2

max{1,

di (u) 2di (u)
dic , dmax }

.

(40)

Thus, if no action increases the distance to the nearest neighbor, or moves the agent to more than half of the maximum
communication distance from its nearest neighbor, the rejectability of all options is uniform. But if an action causes
the agent’s position to exceed either of those limits, then the
rejectability of that action increases exponentially with the
amount the limitation is exceeded.
Each agent then forms its individually satisficing set as
Σi (qi , t) = {ui ∈ Ui : pSi (ui ; t) ≥ qi pRi (ui ; t)}.

(41)

The satisficing rectangle is then
ℜ(t) = Σ1 (q1 , t) × Σ2 (q2 , t) × · · · × Σn (qn , t).

(42)
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The Group Model
Each agent can also compute its version of a jointly satisficing set. To do this, it needs operational definitions of what
is selectable and rejectable for the group. Since this society
is cooperatively disposed, a simple group social model is immediate: group selectability is proportional to the number of
unvisited and unique nodes directly accessible by the group,
and group rejectability is determined by the loss of connectivity.
The selectability at time t of a group action vector u =
(u1 , . . . , un ) ∈ U = U1 × U2 × · · · × Un is proportional
to: (a) the number of unique unvisited nodes u reaches and (b)
the total number of unique nodes accessible by u (whether or
not visited). The first criterion encourages the group to visit
new nodes, and the second encourages the group to spread out
and seek new territory. For example, in a five-agent system, if
u causes the group to move to four unique unvisited nodes and
one visited node, it will receive a larger selectability than u′ ,
which causes the group to move to three unvisited nodes and
two visited nodes. If, however, there are no currently available
options that will take the group to unvisited nodes, then the
group will at least be encouraged to move to as many different
nodes as possible, thereby spreading out in an attempt to seek
the remaining unvisited nodes. To formalize this structure, let
Nnv (u, t) denote the number of unique unvisited nodes accessible by joint action u at time t, and let Ntot (u, t) denote the
total number of unique nodes (whether or not visited) accessible by u at time t. Then the group selectability at time t is
given by
pSG (u, t) ∝ Nnv (u, t) + Ntot (u, t).

All joint options that do not disrupt connectivity are jointly
satisficing, and the joint satisficing set has the form
(45)

The Negotiation Process
Since each agent is able to compute the satisficing rectangle
and the jointly satisficing set, it may also form the compromise
set
CG (t) = RG (t) ∩ ΣG (t).

If the compromise set contains more than one vector, ties
are broken by a simple lexicographical ordering. At the first
level, only those jointly satisficing options most selectable to
the group (visiting the greatest number of new nodes) are retained. If this set contains multiple elements, the second level
of ordering is to rank the agents dynamically based on the
number of unvisited nodes in their option sets. The agents
then select the vector which is most individually selectable to
the highest-ranking agent. Further ties are broken by deferring
to the individual preferences of lower-ranking agents until a
unique solution results.
A Simple Example: 5x5 Grid
As a simple example, consider a square grid of 25 nodes
with nearest neighbor connections. Five agents start in the
lower left corner and are assigned to traverse the graph with
a communication radius of 1.6 times the distance between
nodes. The agents, denoted a1 through a5 , travel along paths
depicted in Figure 6.

(43)

Since the group as a whole shares the requirement to maintain connectivity, group rejectability is concerned with, and
only with, maintaining group connectivity. This criterion results in an extremely simple group rejectability function:

0 if u maintains comm. at time t
pRG (u, t) =
. (44)
1 otherwise

ΣG (t) = {u: pRG (u, t) = 0}.
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(46)

If Cq is empty, then the negotiation mechanism of satisficing
game theory is used: agents incrementally lower their qi values until the compromise set is no longer empty. This models
a form of autonomous negotiation in which each agent compromises and gives up a little performance to find a solution
that is satisfactory to the entire group.

Figure 6: 5x5 Traversal Paths
The group selectability pSG encourages the agents to fan
out as they traverse the graph. After simultaneously visiting
the middle nodes, they converge as they approach the top right
corner of the graph. A minimum number of nodes are visited
by more than one agent, and the graph is searched quickly and
efficiently. Connectivity is maintained throughout, allowing
information to be relayed to all agents.
Random Graph Simulations
More complicated graphs were created by randomly generating 100 nodes within a 25×25 region using a uniform distribution. Edges were added to connect each node with its four
nearest neighbors. An example graph is shown in Figure 7.
Three search scenarios were conducted for each graph: (a) a
five-agent search with a communications range of two units;
(b) a three-agent search with a communication range of three
units; and (c) a single-agent search. For consistency, agents begin their search from a randomly selected node near the center
of the graph.
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in a similar manner, as the ratio of the lower bound of distance traveled in the baseline (total distance traveled prorated
per agent) to the actual average distance traveled per agent.
Table 4: Results averaged over 10 randomly generated graphs.
The bottom row is the boundedly-rational baseline.
Agts
5
3
1
1∗

Figure 7: Sample Random Graph with 100 Nodes
Ideally, simulation results should be compared with those
of an optimal search, but this is computationally infeasible for
graphs of this complexity. To create a baseline for comparison, we implemented a boundedly-rational single agent algorithm that searches until the search cost exceeds the anticipated
improvement of further search. The algorithm systematically
conducts a depth-first search of possible tours starting from
each node in the graph. After 30 minutes of CPU time, the
algorithm switches to the next node in the graph as the starting
point. Each level in the search tree corresponds to the choice
of next unvisited node to visit; a greedy algorithm is employed,
and nodes are considered in the order of their proximity to the
previous node.
The boundedly-rational search algorithm differs from the
satisficing search algorithm in three significant ways. First, it
is free to start from any node in the graph. Second, its decisions
are based on an extensive global search rather than conditions
local to the agents and limited look-ahead, so it is poorly suited
to real-time operation. Finally, since it involves a single agent,
it has no movement constraints to ensure communication is
maintained. Thus, although the boundedly-rational results provide bounds on the efficiency of satisficing multi-agent search
algorithms, the bounds are not particularly tight.
Table 4 displays results averaged over 10 graphs for the
three satisficing scenarios (top three rows) along with the
boundedly-rational baseline (bottom row). From left to right,
the columns list the number of agents, the communication radius, the average number of nodes visited per agent during
the search, a measure of search efficiency referred to as node
efficiency, the average distance traveled per agent during the
search, and a second measure of efficiency called distance efficiency. Node efficiency is a measure of the extent to which
duplication of visited nodes is avoided; the repetition exhibited
by the boundedly-rational search is considered a lower-bound
(total nodes visited prorated per agent). The measure is given
by the ratio of this lower bound to the actual average number visited by each agent. Distance efficiency is determined

Com Rad
2
3
n/a
n/a

Nds/Agt
40
52
121
111

Nd Eff
56%
71%
92%
100%

Dst/Agt
17.3
21.5
46.3
43.5

Dst Eff
50%
67%
94%
100%

As the number of agents increases, each agent visits fewer
nodes and travels a shorter distance, but both measures of efficiency also decrease. There are three principal causes of this
behavior. First, all agents start at the same point, and it takes
time to spread out and search the graph. Second, agents must
remain near each other to remain in communication. Third,
certain nodes in the sparse graph become natural hubs for
agents to remain and serve as communication relays.
The simulations provide numerous examples of emergent
behavior that is not anticipated by the modeling assumptions.
For example, as the group spreads out, the more central agents
tend to sacrifice individual preferences (searching new territory) to maintain the connectivity of the group by remaining
stationary while outlying agents continue to search, and this
continues until the outlying agents return to the group. The
willingness to act as a relay is not explicitly programmed into
the agents, and it is a significant example of emergent coordination as agents balance the interests of the group with their
individual interests.
Figure 8 illustrates typical emergent behavior. The small circle representing each node is filled if visited, and the large circle centered on each agent represents its communication range.
In the first frame, all three agents are heading towards unique,
unvisited nodes. In the second frame, a1 and a2 are moving
to the left while a3 moves to the right. In the third frame,
the agents are approaching the limits of their communication
range. To avoid communication loss, a2 is returning to an area
with no unvisited nodes so that it can relay messages between
a1 and a3 , as they cannot directly communicate. In the fourth
frame, a1 and a3 continue their search, facilitated by a2 ’s sacrifice.
DISCUSSION
The Ultimatum game and the random graph search illustrate the wide range of applications for which satisficing game
theory is applicable. In the Ultimatum game, the behavior
of the players is governed by their social attributes, and the
emergent group-level preferences can range from fair and wellcoordinated to dysfunctional and ill-coordinated. The Ultimatum game is a static (one-move per player) game, whereas the
graph search is a dynamic decision problem. In the graphsearch problem, the goal of the agents is to find functional
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utility-maximization formulation of the graph search problem
would require the identification of an optimal strategy (most
likely in the sense of bounded rationality), which would require extensive computation. Even if an optimal solution for
the group were known, there would be no way to determine
whether it would be acceptable to each of the individual agents.
With the failure-avoidance formulation, however, it is possible
to identify in real-time potential solutions that are simultaneously acceptable to all agents and to the group. The key to
this success is that the agents, and the group as a whole, each
identify multiple choices that are good enough according to
a mathematically precise criterion, thus providing them with
negotiating room to settle on a compromise.
Conflict can be resolved either by competition or by cooperation. Because it is based on the premise of individual rationality, classical game theory virtually forces competition, even if
cooperation would be more natural and beneficial to the players individually and to the group as a whole. On the other hand,
satisficing game theory permits conflict to be treated either as
competition or cooperation with equal facility. It therefore provides a neutral foundation upon which to frame decision problems.
Satisficing game theory provides a framework within which
procedures for negotiation and compromise can be implemented. By contrast, solution concepts associated with individual rationality provide existence proofs only; they are not
constructive. For example, although a Nash equilibrium always exists, the theory does not provide a procedure for the
agents to follow to arrive at the prescribed solution. Also,
rather than simulating social relationships with an intrinsically
asocial model, conditional altruism—a willingness either to
defer to or to punish others according to the situation—can
be modeled without completely redefining the game.

Figure 8: A sequence of frames showing emergent coordinated
behavior.
compromises as the agents function in a multi-move dynamic
environment. Emergent behavior is manifest by the agents as
they self-select the different roles of searcher and communication relay.
The two applications demonstrate the robustness of the
failure-avoidance formulation of a decision problem. With
the Ultimatum game, the classical formulation as utility maximization is a poor model of actual human behavior. Formulated in terms of failure avoidance, the social attributes of the
agents can be explicitly included in the model as parameters,
and their effect on the decisions can be observed. A traditional

Social utilities and satisficing game theory together provide
a systematic methodology for the design of socially rational
multi-agent systems. Domain knowledge and the rules of the
game are encoded into the social utility functions that compose
the interdependence function. Because they possess the mathematical properties of multivariate probability mass functions,
social utilities account for all possible social interactions, take
advantage of whatever independence and conditioning properties are relevant, and make it impossible to assign high selectability (or rejectability) to an action set and its complement. Satisficing game theory makes explicit the conditions
under which group and individual preferences can be reconciled, and provides a mechanism for altruism, negotiation and
compromise.
Social rationality and satisficing game theory generalize the
notions of individual rationality and competitive optimality,
but at a price. The computational burden of the satisficing approach grows combinatorically if all possible interconnections
between agents are considered. Fortunately, as with Bayesian
networks, it is reasonable to expect that in practical situations
and especially for large groups, the connectivity of praxeic networks will be somewhat sparse. The use of hierarchical and
Markov structures can simplify the construction of the inter-
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dependence function and further reduce computation. Multiagent decision making is, by its very nature, a complex enterprise. Moreover, the enterprise of analyzing complex natural systems or synthesizing complex artificial systems is intrinsically difficult and challenging. But, as Palmer observed,
“Complexity is no argument against a theoretical approach if
the complexity arises not out of the theory itself but out of
the material which any theory ought to handle” [48]. While
it is desirable in the interest of tractability to simplify a social
model as much as possible, eliminating important social relationships in order to comply with individual rationality may
provide an inadequate model of the society under investigation.
A key contribution of this paper is the demonstration that
the syntax of probability theory, which is of immense value
as a means of modeling epistemological phenomena, can also
be of value as a model of praxeological phenomena. In a personal communication to Judea Pearl, Glenn Shafer observed
that “probability is not really about numbers; it is about the
structure of reasoning” [35, p 15]. The thesis of this paper
is that the mathematical structure of probability theory is also
about the structure of coherent social interaction. The combination of social utilities and satisficing game theory forms the
basis of a unified treatment of group and individual decision
making.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THE SOCIALITY THEOREM
Sufficiency is established by setting
F [pGj (uj ), pGi |Gj (ui |uj )] = pGi |Gj (ui |uj )pGj (uj ). (47)
The non-negativity condition ensures that F is non-decreasing
in both arguments.
To prove necessity, let Gi , Gj and Gk be arbitrary pairwise disjoint sub-societies of G, and let pGi ∪Gj ∪Gk , pGi |Gj ∪Gk ,
pGi ∪Gj |Gk , pGi ∪Gj , pGi |Gj , and pGi be endogenously aggregated non-negative functions; that is, there exists a function F such that pGi ∪Gj (ui , uj ) = F [pGj (uj ), pGi |Gj (ui |uj )]
∀(ui , uj ) ∈ Ui × Uj .
By framing invariance,


F pGj ∪Gk (uj , uk ), pGi |Gj ∪Gk (ui |uj , uk )


= F pGk (uk ), pGi ∪Gj |Gk (ui , uj |uk ) . (48)
But

and



pGj ∪Gk (uj , uk ) = F pGk (uk ), pGj |Gk (uj |uk )

(49)

pGi ∪Gj |Gk (ui , uj |uk )


= F pGj |Gk (uj |uk ), pGi |Gj ∪Gk (ui |uj , uk ) . (50)

Thus,




F F pGk (uk ), pGj |Gk (uj |uk ) , pGi |Gj ∪Gk (ui |uj , uk )




= F pGk (uk ), F pGj |Gk (uj |uk ), pGi |Gj ∪Gk (ui |uj , uk ) .

(51)

Archibald et al.

In terms of general arguments, this equation becomes
F [F (x, y), z] = F [x, F (y, z)] ,

(52)

called the associativity equation, which has been studied extensively [49, 50]. It has been shown by [51] (see also [52])
that if F is differentiable in both arguments, then the general
solution of (52) is
f [F (x, y)] = f (x)f (y)

(53)

for some positive continuous monotonic increasing function f ,
which is otherwise arbitrary. Taking f as the identity function,
we obtain


pGi ∪Gj (ui , uj ) = F pGi (ui ), pGj |Gi (uj |ui )
= pGi (ui )pGj |Gi (uj |ui ),
known as the product rule. It can also be shown, following
Cox [51], that
X
X
pGi (ui ) +
pG¬i (u¬i ) = 1
(54)
ui ∈Ui

u¬i ∈U¬i

for all sub-societies Gi , which is known as the sum rule. Finally, the non-decreasing property requires that all preference
functions be non-negative, thus the preference functions must
be mass functions.
We note that, regardless of the function f , so long as it is
positive, continuous, monotonic, and increasing, the product
and sum rules apply, and the preference functions are mass
functions. Thus, we may take f to be identity without loss of
generality.
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